This article breaks new ground by reframing the context in which the governments of India and the Soviet Union arrived at an understanding that determined the course of cinematic exchange between the two countries during the Cold War. It suggests that official Indian attitudes to the export of commercial films to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics were not formulated on the basis of carefully calibrated political considerations, but rather on an ad hoc footing, and in response to a combination of unwelcome Soviet pressure and commercial concerns voiced by Indian filmmakers.
ministry of Information and Broadcasting (I&B). Writing from Mumbai, where his production company, Naya Sansar (New World), had developed cinematic blockbusters such as Awara (Tramp), Abbas lamented efforts to export his latest film, Rahi (Wayfarer), to the Soviet Union, had turned into 'a 'rather tedious and unfortunate affair.' 1 The crux of Abbas' disaffection centred on the Indian government's interaction with N. P. Koulebiakin, a Soviet citizen who had arrived in the subcontinent the previous year. An Indologist and professor of Sanskrit, Koulebiakin had come to South Asia to manage the Indian branch of Sovexportfilm, the official Soviet agency dealing with the import and export of feature films. During the proceeding eighteen months, Koulebiakin's efforts to enlist the support of the Government of India in procuring Indian films for Soviet audiences had met with a series of setbacks, frustrations and misunderstandings.
To Abbas' alarm, protracted negotiations between Indian government officials and
Koulebiakin over the export of Rahi had taken an increasingly acrimonious turn that threatened both wider Indo-Soviet relations, and the film producer's access to lucrative export revenues. The Indian filmmaker reflected ruefully that since entering into discussions with Koulebiakin in an effort to bring his work to cinemagoers inside the communist bloc, 'much water has flown down the Volga as well as the Jumna, but my dilemma and puzzlement remain very much the same.' 'So far as I can see, ' Abbas complained bitterly to the ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 'the Soviet Government is not going to displease the Government of India for the sake of a single film (which happens to be my film) but I am afraid the whole affair is going to leave a bad taste in their mouth, and their whole scheme of buying Indian films may be jettisoned.' Concluding his missive to C. B. Rao with a dramatic flourish of artistic pique, the Indian film impresario cautioned that, 'Your Ministry's ban on RAHI's sojourn to Russia will only deliver the coup de grace to the reckless idealism of producers. ' 2 The genesis of Indian cinematic exchange with the Soviet Union during the Cold War period has received scant scholarly attention. Accounts of the history of India cinema have been framed overwhelmingly in a narrow domestic context, privileging In August, India's film censors passed the original cut of Rahi, which had been produced in Hindi for a domestic audience, without any cuts. An English language version of the film was subsequently examined by a special film committee, convened that nascent post-colonial states were little more than imperialist puppets. One Indian official recorded that the state-controlled Soviet press seemed determined to portray India as, 'a stronghold of reaction, a persecutor of democratic forces, a hanger-on of the Anglo-American bloc, and the harbinger of a new Imperialism in the East.' 16 In June 1948, writing to his sister and India's Ambassador to Moscow, Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, Jawaharlal Nehru expressed deep concern about the official Russian attitude towards India. 'Our attempts to increase friendly intercourse between India and the Several Indian films which convey a most degrading and undesirable impression of the country and its people have been imported into the Communist countries and adapted for local use and are being widely shown in communist countries. For example, "Uprooted" by Newail Ghosh, "Children of the Earth", by Peoples Theatre and "Neecha Nigar", agave a one-sided picture of Indian life, and yet the public in the U.S.S.R. and other places are being given this distorted view of India. 28 Attempts to impose some form of control the export of Indian films to communist countries through the central film censor board had, the MEA observed, met with protests from local embassies. While the Indian government had done its best to accommodate requests from the eastern bloc for the export of films, the MEA noted that, 'as far as Indian films are concerned only the undesirable ones are selected for exhibition to their [the Soviets] own people.' This was all the more troubling to the MEA since Indian embassies in communist countries had no facilities to project an alternative image of India by, for example, arranging public screenings of films that portrayed a more positive and progressive impression of life in the subcontinent. 29 Against this background, Koulebiakin's drive to export Indian films to the Soviet it is considered as one of our best films of the year and might even get an award.' 'If it is a good film and it is made clear that it deals with our pre-Independence period,'
the Indian leader pronounced definitively, 'there might perhaps, be no objection to its being sent to the USSR. ' 32 Nehru's intercession prompted a smug MEA to call upon the Information and Broadcasting ministry to 'reconsider' its position on Rahi. 33 In response, B. V.
Keskar, India's minister for Information and Broadcasting, elected to beat a tactical retreat in relation to Abbas' film, in the hope of securing a strategic victory on the broader question of film export controls. Keskar denied somewhat implausibly that there had ever been any question of his ministry discouraging Sovexportfilm from distributing films in the USSR that had been certified by the central board of censors, Rahi included. Rather, the minister claimed, his departments concern with the operations of Sovexportfilm had centred on matters of appropriate procedure. Above all, Keskar pointed to Koulebiakin's presumption that, having selected a list of Indian films for export without first consulting officials at the I&B ministry, it would be a mere formality to obtain the Indian government's post-facto approval. Such an approach was all the more problematic, he asserted, when, 'in making the selection preference has been given [by Sovexportfilm] to films which show class conflict or economic trouble or revolt against colonialism… [and] is therefore tendentious and would not convey an adequate idea of Indian films.' In the absence of adequate film export controls, Keskar argued, Indian movies risked, 'being put to unscrupulous use in Russia.' 'It would not be desirable for foreigners to make a selection of Indian propaganda material from their point of view,' the minister added, 'and then expect the Government of India to accept that selection and officially approve it.' In short, the ministry of Information and Broadcasting insisted that, 'What must be made clear is that, if any film is to be shown abroad with the approval of the Government of India, the initial selection must be made by the Government of India.' 34 On the specific matter of Rahi, D. Krishna Ayyar was deputed to instruct cinematography. 'Whereas in the previous Indian films we have seen social problems presented as an undercurrent, between the lines, as it were,' Soviet citizens were informed, 'here [in Rahi] they ring out with full power.' 40 The appeal of Indian films behind the Iron Curtain was brought home to Indian government officials the following year, when Jawaharlal Nehru paid a state visit to the Soviet Union. Nehru's delegation included both Rahi's leading man, Dev Anand, and Raj Kapoor, star of the hit film, Awara. As the official Indian party travelled across the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, its members were struck by an apparently genuine public affinity for Indian cinema. One Indian diplomat recorded that:
We saw a number of Indian pictures being shown (I was told to packed houses) not only in Central Asia, but as far north as Magnitogorsk. At one town...I entered my room in the villa placed at our disposal, I heard a catchy tune with a lilt being played on the gramophone. Experience at another town had taught me that the piece came from the film "Awara". 41 Soviet authorities carefully stage-managed the Indian delegation's programme. Yet, the fact that Awara is estimated to have attracted cinema audiences in the Soviet Union of some sixty million, suggests that Indian cinema did resonate particularly deeply with the country's citizens. 42 In part, this can be attributed to the socialist sentiments running through many Indian films, Rahi included. Equally, the vibrancy, colour, exuberance, and infuriatingly catchy songs that came to typify Indian cinematic output, offered a striking counterpoint to the duller and more mundane everyday realities of life inside the eastern bloc.
Significantly, the modus operandi that Sovexportfilm established with the Indian government as a consequence of the Rahi affair, served as a model for Indo-Soviet cinematic exchange throughout the remainder of the Cold War. Periodic disputes continued to surface between different ministries inside the Indian government over the suitability of particular films for export to the Soviet Union. 43 On occasions, Koulebiakin and his successors clashed with the ministry of Information and Broadcasting over the quantity, quality, and content of Indian films released to Soviet audiences. In March 1955, Koulebiakin was to be found bemoaning the absence of films from Bengal and south India on approved lists that the I&B ministry had, in collaboration with the Film Association of India, begun to issue to Sovexportfilm.
'Naturally you cannot expect that all of the films so far recommended by you will be liked by us,' Koulebiakin grumbled in a letter to the under secretary of I&B. ' We cannot understand why we should be deprived of the possibility to buy more films from India.' 44 Generally, however, whilst chaffing at the constraints that its informal understanding with the Indian government imposed on Sovexportfilm's freedom of action in the Indian film market, Moscow proved willing to operate within a set of political and cultural parameters imposed by New Delhi. Likewise, while keeping Indian film exports on a tight leash, the Indian government and, more specifically, the ministry of Information and Broadcasting, evidenced a more accommodating line with Sovexportfilm in the aftermath of the Rahi affair. In the cinematic realm, at least, whenever wider political considerations permitted, the Indian government invariably did what it could to keep the Soviets happy. 45 Contemporary events have underlined the extent to which cinematic exchange came to represent a significant and enduring element of Indo-Soviet cultural politics during, and beyond, the Cold War. As late as 1984, the Indian film, Disco Dancer, a South Asian version of Saturday Night Fever, with the Bollywood star Mithun Chakraborty reprising the role that catapulted John Travolta to global fame, was pulling in huge audiences in Soviet cinemas. 46 The two governments were also in the midst of negotiations involving the exchange
